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УДК 327:[339.5:623.4](477:510:470):355.01(470:477)
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.17721/1728-2292.2026/1-62/80-86>

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FACTOR OF MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN UKRAINE – CHINA RELATIONS

Background. *In the period before the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, a significant component of bilateral economic contacts was the export of military equipment and weapons by Ukraine to China, which at the same time was the largest importer of domestic military-industrial complex products. Nevertheless, in the conditions of a full-scale war, the importance of military-technical cooperation in Ukraine-China relations not only did not decrease, but also increased significantly, becoming an important factor in the course of the war with the Kremlin. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to analyze the changing nature and role of MTC between Ukraine and China, especially in the conditions of a full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war.*

Methods. *In the process of research, the author relied on the principle of objectivity. Along with this, analytical, historical, statistical, generalizing methods, as well as the case method were used.*

Results. *The study demonstrates the distinction of two fundamentally different periods in the field of MTC between Ukraine and China: pre-war and since the full-scale invasion. After the declaration of independence and until 2022, Ukraine was one of the sources of military equipment and technologies, sometimes extremely critical for China in its aspirations to become a world military superpower. For the Ukrainian MIC, the export of products to China was of great importance due to the lack of significant domestic orders, and China took advantage of this due to the urgent need for alternatives to Western and Russian arms supplies. After the full-scale Russian invasion, the situation became diametrically opposite: Ukraine began to actively purchase Chinese drones and components for them. Meanwhile, Russia became an even more active importer of Chinese dual-use products. Against the background of systematic monitoring and preventive threats of sanctions from Western countries, the PRC officially restricted its exports, but in fact the Kremlin continues to import everything it needs from China on a large scale, but Ukraine has suffered significantly from this. This approach on the part of the PRC became one of the factors that led to Ukraine starting to lose in the so-called "drone war" with the RF.*

Conclusions. *China gained access to Ukrainian military technology in the pre-war period. However, against the backdrop of a full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, Beijing is clearly supporting the further expansion of the Russian MIC with dual-use products. This leads to a constant official dialogue between Ukraine and the PRC in a negative direction.*

China is interested in prolonging the Russian-Ukrainian war in order to use it as a tool in its efforts to establish control over Taiwan. A significant threat to Ukraine would be a hypothetical situation of direct arms supplies from China to Russia. In any case, there is an urgent need for the Ukrainian MIC to localize the production of drones and their components.

Keywords: *military-technical cooperation, arms trade, dual-use products, Ukraine-China relations, Sino-Russian relations, full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, Chinese "pro-Russian neutrality"*

Background

Since 2019, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become Ukraine's top trading partner. In the structure of bilateral trade, Ukraine exports mainly agricultural products and imports finished machinery and electrical products, including some dual-use goods until recently. However, this kind of situation has not always been inherent in bilateral economic contacts, as Ukraine has played a significant role in building the technical potential of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA). However, the situation has changed due to the fact that transfers of Chinese-made military products have become critically important in the context of a full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, not only from the point of view of ensuring the technical level of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), but also the continuation of the war from the Kremlin's side. Thus, military-technical cooperation (MTC) with both Ukraine and the Russian Federation (RF) became a significant lever of influence on the course of the war, as well as one of the elements of the geopolitical game in relations with Western countries.

Literature review. The segment of military-technical cooperation in world politics is increasingly becoming a subject of interest for researchers, which is associated with a significant growth in conflict-proneness in international relations. Traditionally, the basis for the analysis of military transfers is the annual analytical researches of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI records that Ukraine became the largest importer of

weapons in the world in the period 2020-2024 (8.8 % of global arms imports) against the background of a full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2025, p. 7). Meanwhile, the war with the Kremlin is a catalyst for the growth of research in the field of military-technical cooperation by Ukrainian analysts. The number of analytical reports or information messages devoted to certain aspects affecting various sides of the topic of MTC with the participation of the PRC, and most often military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the RF against the background of the war, is constantly growing. For example, journalists from the "Schemes" project of Radio Liberty have investigated in detail how China supplies Russia with critically important metals after the introduction of Western sanctions (Radio Liberty, 2025). A. Oksentiuk, considering military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, analyzes Sino-Russian MTC after the collapse of the USSR (Oksentiuk, 2025). The pre-war period of MTC between Ukraine and China is also episodically covered in studies of Ukrainian researchers. Thus, in the analytical report of Yu. Poita, key projects of Ukrainian-Chinese MTC during this period are briefly noted (Poita, 2021).

The actualization of the consideration of the factor of military-technical cooperation with the participation of the PRC against the background of the Russian-Ukrainian war is also inherent in foreign analysts. For example, E. Dou, P. L. Wu. in the columns of the American newspaper The Washington Post, considering the features of the pre-war

period of Ukrainian-Chinese military-technical cooperation, raise the question of whether Beijing will reciprocate Kyiv in terms of military transfers in the context of the war with the Kremlin (Dou, & Wu, 2022). It should be especially noted the scientific research of S. Kirchberger, who considers military-technical cooperation in the tripartite dimension "PRC-RF-Ukraine" (Kirchberger, p. 75–100). Thus, this topic of research is marked by significant dynamism and relevance, which is combined with the presence of gaps in the comprehensive study of MTC with the PRC since Ukraine gained independence. Moreover, there are basically no domestic scientific works on this topic, which makes this study more relevant.

The purpose of the study is to analyze the changing nature and role of military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and China in bilateral relations, especially in the context of a full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war.

Methods

In the process of research, the author relied on the principle of objectivity. Along with this, the following methods were used: analytical – division of military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and the PRC into a number of aspects and study of their features, generalization – in the context of determining the general features of China's policy in the field of MTC against the backdrop of a full-scale war, historical – study of the transformation of MTC from the moment of the declaration of Ukraine's independence to the present, statistical – in terms of the examination of arms trade volumes for different periods, the case study method was applied when considering Ukrainian-Chinese disputes regarding the "Motor Sich" enterprise.

Results

Given the embargo on arms supplies from Western countries as a result of the events on Tiananmen Square in 1989, the PRC is beginning to look for alternative sources of arms and military technology supplies. In this context, Ukraine, with its powerful military-industrial complex (MIC) after the collapse of the USSR, has become one of partners in the field of military-technical cooperation. On the one hand, this was consistent with the policy of survival of the domestic defense complex, which in the post-Soviet period, in fact, until 2014, mainly fulfilled foreign orders, and also, at least, to support the development of high-tech sectors of the economy at a certain level. On the other hand, China during this period made large-scale purchases of products from the Russian MIC, and therefore military-technical cooperation with Ukraine was viewed by Beijing as steps to avoid unilateral dependence on Moscow. In addition, unlike the RF, Kyiv had no concerns about the growth of the military power of China, which simplified access to certain military technologies. It should be noted that the period of bilateral MTC from the moment of Ukraine's declaration of independence until the full-scale Russian invasion was characterized by the exclusive consolidation of the role of supplier by Kyiv and consumer by Beijing.

The most striking example of Ukraine's military-technical role in strengthening the PLA's capabilities is the sale in 1998 of the aircraft carrier "Varyag", built in Soviet times (70 % readiness), which Beijing purchased through a private company with the aim of allegedly turning it into a floating casino (Drach, 2011). However, when "Varyag" arrived on the shores, it later became the first aircraft carrier in service with the PLA under the name "Liaoning" and a model for China to build its own military machinery of this level (today Beijing already has 3 aircraft carriers). Thus, Ukraine contributed to China's transformation into a world naval military power.

Along with this, Ukraine has strengthened China's military potential in other aspects. For example, Beijing received technologies for developing the GT-25000 naval gas turbine (which became the foundation for the development of the Chinese QC 280 gas turbines equipped with Type 055 (Nanchang-class) destroyers), a phased array radar system for naval vessels, which became the basis for the emergence of a Chinese analogue of the radar system on warships, similar to the American Aegis multifunctional missile defense system (Kirchberger, 2022, p. 85–86; Dou, & Wu, 2022). It is also worth noting the provision of advisory support from Ukrainian specialists in the construction of warships, training aircraft pilots on aircraft carriers, and even the development of nuclear warheads (Kirchberger, 2022, p. 84). It is likely that domestic experts provided support in other areas of China's military-technical development, moved to this country against the background of socio-economic problems.

A characteristic feature of bilateral MTC was the concealment of the real volumes and technologies received by the Chinese side. However, some episodes of Ukrainian-Chinese arms transfers, which became publicly known, had negative consequences for the image of Ukraine as an arms exporter. It concerns a case of violation of the international non-proliferation regime – the sale to Beijing (along with Tehran) 6 X-55 cruise missiles in 2001 (Space Daily, 2005). The transfer of such a level of military technology to the PRC caused considerable concern, primarily in the USA and Japan, because missiles of this type with a flight range of 3,500 kilometers would easily allow Beijing to hit the territory of the Land of the Rising Sun.

Regarding the volume of arms transfers, SIPRI data shows that before the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China was the largest buyer of domestic military-industrial complex products. For example, according to the results of the 2016–2020 five-year period, Beijing accounted for 36% of domestic military exports, which generated revenues of \$80-90 million annually, while Ukraine was the third largest supplier of weapons to China with a share of 6.3% (mainly gas turbines and engines for fighter jets) (Xue, 2021).

Despite the significant volumes, bilateral MTC was not without its problems. The most telling example in this context is the situation with the Ukrainian strategic enterprise "Motor Sich", which specializes in the production, modernization and repair of engines for aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, as well as industrial gas turbine units. It is worth considering that the Chinese military-industrial complex still has problems with engine production (DefenceXP, 2025), and therefore the technological capabilities of "Motor Sich" were of high interest to it.

In its foreign policy practice the Communist Party of China (CPC) actively uses supposedly private companies to achieve economic and other goals for state purposes. In the case of "Motor Sich", such a "Trojan horse" was the company Skyrizon, which managed to buy out a controlling stake in the strategic enterprise through its pro-Russian leadership. Initially, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) reacted to the situation, which blocked the sale of the company in 2017 (Holubov, 2019). It is obvious that the unique enterprise is of known value for the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. Along with this, the US expressed concern about the purchase of shares due to fears that access to technologies in the engine production sector would significantly strengthen China's military potential. Thus, in 2019, Washington publicly criticized the sale of a strategic enterprise to a Chinese company. Nevertheless, the Chinese company did not give up attempts to take control of

the enterprise for some time, but the imposition of sanctions against Skyrizon, first by the United States and then by Ukraine, as well as the decision of the National Security Council of Ukraine to nationalize "Motor Sich" in 2021, put an end to Beijing's aspirations (Solonina, 2021).

In turn, Skyrizon filed a lawsuit against the Ukrainian state in an international tribunal demanding compensation of \$ 4.5 billion (Terajima, 2021). Moreover, Beijing officially called on Ukraine to respect the rights and interests of Chinese companies and investors after the transfer of control of the enterprise to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine under martial law (Global Times, 2022). It is obvious that the scandal with "Motor Sich" had a number of negative consequences for Ukraine both in relations with the PRC and its position in the context of a full-scale war with Russia, as well as its international investment image. In this context, it can be added that Moscow and the pro-Russian political force "Opposition Bloc for Life" took advantage of the scandal to launch an anti-Ukrainian information campaign (Chornohor, 2021).

However, it should be noted that in general, the Ukrainian-Chinese military cooperation has been marked by a number of other problematic moments. For example, the PRC has been traditionally practicing unauthorized copying of weapons and equipment purchased from partners, with the subsequent production of its own analogues and sale to the international market. In the case of Ukraine, such a situation arose after the sale in 2002 of the automated electronic warfare systems "Mandat-B1E", which are used to suppress ground-based radio stations (Poita, 2021). In addition, after 2014, the threat of Beijing's transfer of critical technologies to the RF through joint military production programs increased. In particular, this concerns the problem of Chinese aspirations to take control of "Motor Sich", because the Russian military-industrial complex also has problems in the engine manufacturing sector. Finally, it is also worth adding that, despite significant amounts of cooperation, Ukraine has not been able to significantly take advantage of the financial capabilities of the Chinese side to strengthen its own MIC, including due to the fact that bilateral MTC was characterized by orientation towards the needs of Beijing.

However, the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war has made significant adjustments to bilateral military transfers. Since 2022, Ukraine has been actively purchasing dual-purpose products of Chinese production, primarily MAVIC drones (manufacturer – Chinese company DJI), which have become a significant factor on the battlefield for the AFU. At the same time, Chinese drones are actively purchased by the other side of the war – the aggressor country Russia. Thus, Chinese drones have become a significant factor in the Russian-Ukrainian war. In this context, it is worth emphasizing that unmanned aerial vehicles have become a very significant element of the war between Ukraine and the Kremlin. For example, the Ukrainian leadership noted that in 2025 80 % of Russian equipment and personnel were hit by drones (Melkozerova, 2025).

Moreover, Beijing continues to actively support Moscow with dual-use products of a different nature (Oksentiuk, 2025). Among other things, Chinese companies supply machine tools for the production of weapons, equipment for the construction of fortifications, electronic components, in particular, semiconductors, navigation, optical and telemetry systems, engines, high-quality steel, rare metals, processor modules, antenna field systems, control boards, chemical elements – in general, critically important aspects for the functioning of the military-industrial complex in strategically important areas. For example, China remains the only source

of supplies of such rare-earth metals as gallium, germanium and antimony, which are necessary for the production of many areas of the defense industry, in particular, in the production of nuclear weapons (Radio Liberty, 2025).

The importance of such supplies of Chinese dual-use products for the Russian MIC can be evidenced by the statement of the EU Sanctions Envoy David O'Sullivan, who noted at the Fair Play conference in Kyiv in 2025 that 80% of the components that the RF uses in the production of weapons come through China (China supplies...intelligence data, 2025). Another senior Western official, former US Deputy Secretary of State, K. Campbell claimed that the PRC secretly provides significant support for the development and diversification of various aspects of Russian military power, and in return receives the latest technologies in the areas of submarines, missiles and other sensitive sectors that Moscow previously refused to provide. In addition, according to the former American official, these technologies pose a danger to the United States and its Indo-Pacific partners (Lau, 2024).

Since 2022, Western countries have repeatedly emphasized the inadmissibility of Chinese military-technical support for the Kremlin and, given the high degree of dependence of the PRC's export-oriented economy on sales markets in the US and the EU, have used the tool of threatening sanctions. This situation has obviously led to the fact that China is currently not directly supplying weapons and equipment to the Kremlin, as the US has publicly noted (Ukrinform – Ukrainian National News Agency, 2024). Meanwhile, this forces Beijing to use loopholes in international law, as well as a low level of export control to support the Kremlin even with dual-use products. In the supply of dual-use products, the PRC and the RF actively use fake financial intermediaries and fictitious distributors, shell companies, and rebranding Chinese electronics as civilian products (Oksentiuk, 2025). Moreover, according to Estonian foreign intelligence, China is a key hub for circumventing Western sanctions on the supply of dual-use products, and 80% of such components have reached the Russian MIC through Chinese companies (Syta, 2025).

Due to the factor of dual-use products supplies, Washington and Brussels officially recognized that Chinese support for the Russian military-industrial complex allows the Kremlin to continue the war against Ukraine during the seventh high-level meeting within the framework of the US-EU dialogue in 2024 (Radio Liberty, 2024). Besides, the US has imposed sanctions against a number of Chinese companies for supplying dual-use products to Russia, in response to which Beijing noted that such actions are illegal and not based on facts (Ślōdkowski, 2024).

Permanent criticism from Western countries and episodes of sanctions led to the CPC deciding to officially introduce restrictions on the export of dual-use products in early July 2024. The list of goods requiring permission from the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC included a wide range of products from software to industrial equipment (Artemchuk, 2024). This step obviously led to a number of disruptions in the functioning of the Russian MIC. Nevertheless, a wide range of experts note that, despite the restrictions, the Kremlin continues to receive dual-use products from China through circumvention schemes. As an argument for this position, we can cite the results of an investigation conducted by journalists from the British newspaper The Telegraph, published in early 2026. The Telegraph claims that by supplying high-tech equipment, Beijing helped expand the production of Russian hypersonic missiles with nuclear warheads "Oreshnik" (Yan, 2026).

The PRC has tightened such restrictions several times, in particular, in the sector of the export of drones and their components, which has also brought significant problems to Ukraine's military power. For example, at the end of July 2024, Beijing announced a ban on the sale abroad of all civilian drones that can be used for military purposes or in terrorist activities (Bloomberg, 2024). This has become a significant problem for Ukraine, as in early 2024, China accounted for 98% of total drone imports (Hmyria, 2024). Ukraine has found a way out by purchasing drones and components through Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and other EU countries. However, since 2025, Beijing has begun to hinder Ukrainian drone production, limiting the export of important components for them not only directly, but also to Ukraine's Western allies (Borovyk, 2025). As a result, the domestic MIC is focusing its efforts on autonomous drone production at an accelerated pace.

However, the suspension of drone exports to Ukraine did not limit the Kremlin's access to these Chinese products, which clearly illustrates the peculiarities of China's neutrality position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. In this context, it can also be added that in July 2024 the Bloomberg news agency reported that Chinese and Russian companies were jointly developing a new strike drone similar to the Iranian Shahed drone (Nardelli, Jacobs, & Wickham, 2024). However, the use of this technology on the territory of Ukraine has not been recorded.

Nevertheless, the Chinese approach to MTC against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian war has de facto somewhat affected the balance between the potentials of the parties in the drone sector. Thus, domestic high-ranking officials directly emphasize that China's military-technical support was one of the key factors that allowed the Kremlin to overtake Ukraine in the field of drone production – for example, as of 2025, Kyiv was producing about 100 attack drones per day, while Moscow managed to increase this figure to 300 and at the same time create the basis for further scaling (Melkozerova, 2025). It is likely that taking into account this situation, in July 2025 Ukraine imposed sanctions against five Chinese companies, the details of which were found in downed Russian drones (Khudiakova, 2025).

Noticeably, that Beijing permanently rejects accusations of military-technical support for the RF (Ukrinform – Ukrainian National News Agency, 2025). However, criticism on this issue continues to be heard both from Ukraine and Western countries. Moreover, the Ukrainian side records a number of other aspects of Chinese military-technical assistance to the Kremlin's aggression. Thus, in April 2025, the military-political leadership of Ukraine stated that China supplies Russia with gunpowder and artillery (Nynko, 2025). In addition, in 2024, the Russian army first recorded the use of Chinese ZFB-05 armored vehicles (Hirnyk, 2024).

It is worth recalling that, according to Ukrainian intelligence, Beijing sent about 600 of its military personnel to learn from Russian soldiers experience in countering Western weapons in 2025 (Zakharchenko, 2025). In this context, it should be noted that MTC is a broader concept than arms trade, as it includes many other aspects, including education and training in the use of certain weapons. However, the exchange of experience and knowledge between the two authoritarian regimes is also implemented in the educational and scientific sphere. In particular, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), which, among other things, monitors cooperation between Chinese and Russian universities affiliated with the defense sector. The ASPI notes the intensification of this type of cooperation against the backdrop of a full-scale war, which provides

Moscow with access to technologies blocked by sanctions and contributes to the development of Chinese aerospace research (Standish, 2025).

While, Beijing is trying to gain access to advanced Ukrainian military developments illegally. For example, in July 2025, the SSU detained two Chinese citizens who were trying to export documentation on the production of Ukrainian Neptune missiles (Peleschuk, 2025), which demonstrated their effectiveness in 2022 by sinking the Russian cruiser Moscow. At the same time, the SSU notes that it has recorded the transfer of satellite intelligence data by Beijing for missile strikes on Ukraine, in particular, on the facilities of foreign investors (Karbunar, 2025).

It is worth emphasizing that the issue of MTC has become a permanent subject for discussion at the official level between Ukraine and the PRC. Notably, that Beijing permanently rejects any accusations of providing military-technical support to the Kremlin's aggression. Moreover, Chinese leader Xi Jinping assured Ukrainian President V. Zelenskyy in a telephone conversation that the PRC would not provide any weapons to Russia (Denisova, 2024). Additionally, there are statements from Beijing that if China had really provided military support to Moscow, the war would have ended long ago.

It is also worth adding that in some places about Beijing's cynical rhetoric on the issue of MTC against the backdrop of the war – for example, in April 2024 one of the official representatives of the PRC at the UN noted that the continuation of the supply of weapons to the battlefield does not contribute to the end of the war (Azizova, 2024). In July 2025, also at the UN Security Council level, China expressed concern that new types of weapons, in particular robots, are being tested on the battlefields of Ukraine (Ukrinform – Ukrainian National ..., 2025). It can be assumed that such statements by the PRC are aimed at expressing in diplomatic language a negative attitude towards the provision of military-technical support to Ukraine by Western partners.

In general, China purposefully emphasizes its neutral status in the Russian-Ukrainian war, uses the guise of calls for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, offers certain plans for settlement, and publicly calls on Russia not to use nuclear weapons. However, even taking into account the above-mentioned moments of Sino-Russian cooperation, Beijing's position on the war can be confidently characterized as at least "pro-Russian neutrality".

It is also worth recalling the leak of information published by the Hong Kong newspaper South China Morning Post in July 2025 regarding the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC Wang Yi during a conversation with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy K. Kallas. The Chinese minister noted that Beijing would not allow the military defeat of the RF (Bermingham, 2025). Given this, it is logical to assume that China will continue to support the Kremlin at least with dual-use products.

In this context, the question arises of what goals Beijing pursues, in particular, by providing support for Russia with critically important dual-use products. Most analysts agree that the continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian war distracts the attention and resources of the United States from the Chinese goal of taking control of Taiwan. Additionally, there are scenarios that under certain circumstances Beijing, together with Moscow, may launch a military offensive against the countries of the democratic camp: the Russian army will attack the EU countries, while the PRC attacks Taiwan. Also, the war in Ukraine can be used to some extent for bargaining with Washington for Taiwan. And along with

this, China is increasing its dependence on the RF and gaining more and more access to its resources and, as noted above, to advanced military technologies.

Another point that deserves attention in the context of MTC against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine is the intensification of military transfers between Russia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as the possible role of Beijing in this. Since 2023, North Korea has been supplying ammunition, missiles, and artillery on a large scale. These supplies have played an extremely important role in the process of continuing the slow offensive of the Russian army and launching strikes on Ukrainian civilian objects. This is evidenced by the estimates of both Western (DPRK supplies in 2024 played a critical role, as they accounted for almost half of the shells used by the Russian army) and Ukrainian intelligence (40 % of the Russian army's ammunition in 2025) (The Kyiv Independent, 2024; Krasnolutska, & Safronova, 2025).

However, it is worth noting that the largest trading partner for the DPRK is China. In the context of large-scale international sanctions, this position has led to the fact that Beijing has the greatest leverage over the totalitarian North Korean regime. Given this, large-scale supplies of North Korean weapons, as well as the sending of its military personnel to the war against Ukraine, could not be implemented without the consent of the PRC. In this way, China provided another significant military-technical support to the aggressor country through a third party, avoiding grounds for criticism from Western countries.

An argument for the possible role of the PRC in the deployment of large-scale MTC between Moscow and Pyongyang can be the historical precedent of Chinese policy against the backdrop of the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988). In that situation as in the context of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, Beijing relied on neutrality and a peaceful way to end the war. Meanwhile, through the DPRK, it supplied Iran with tanks, HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles, and even more than a hundred Shenyang J-6 fighters (Defence Express, 2024).

Discussion and conclusions

Thus, the military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and the PRC has undergone radical changes as a result of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. If in the pre-war period Ukraine was one of the sources of military technology for China, then in the conditions of full-scale aggression from the Kremlin, Kyiv is already beginning to actively import dual-use products of Chinese production.

Despite official declarations of neutrality, Beijing is obviously providing military-technical support to Russia on a critical scale with dual-use products. Moreover, currently China's "pro-Russian neutrality" is manifested in blocking the Ukrainian side's access to the urgently needed components for the production of drones, while continuing to supply these components and other types of dual-use products to the RF. This approach of Beijing has become one of the determinants that led to the fact that Russia began to dominate Ukraine in the sector of drone production, which is currently an extremely important factor in the war.

Given the leaks of information about the official Beijing position on the Russian-Ukrainian war, China will continue to provide military-technical and other support to the RF. However, due to the reluctance to fall under Western sanctions, the PRC avoids supplying weapons and military equipment. At the same time, with the tacit consent of the PRC, Moscow receives significant military-technical support from the DPRK. It should be emphasized that hypothetical direct supplies of weapons and military equipment by Beijing

to Russia could become a decisive factor in the course of the war not in favor of Ukraine. Meanwhile, supplies of dual-use products to the Kremlin play a significant role in China's policy of using the Russian-Ukrainian war as an instrument of weakening and putting pressure on Western countries, in particular, in the context of the Taiwan problem.

In general, MTC is a significant and irritating component of bilateral relations. In the pre-war period, each side benefited from military transfers: large-scale arms exports to China became one of the factors for the survival of the domestic military-industrial complex, and at the same time, Beijing received an alternative to dependence on Russian weapons imports. However, the PRC sought to gain control over the strategic enterprise "Motor Sich", taking advantage of the problems of the Ukrainian MIC after the implementation of the hybrid war by the RF.

Also, against the backdrop of a full-scale war, China began to clearly demonstrate a discriminatory policy towards Ukraine in the field of MTC. This became a factor complicating the military capabilities of the AFU and strengthening the potential of the Russian army. It is worth noting that this and other manifestations of Beijing's "pro-Russian neutrality" in the field of MTC lead to a systematic negative discussion between Ukraine and the PRC at the official level, where China rejects any accusations of such support for the Kremlin, but de facto does not stop it.

Sources of funding. This study did not receive any grant from a funding institution in the public, commercial or non-commercial sectors.

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Отримано редакцію журналу / Received: 21.02.26

Прорецензовано / Revised: 05.03.26

Схвалено до друку / Accepted: 14.04.26

Опубліковано / Published: 22.05.26

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ЧИННИК ВІЙСЬКОВО-ТЕХНІЧНОГО СПІВРОБІТНИЦТВА У ВІДНОСИНАХ УКРАЇНА – КНР

Вступ. У період до початку повномасштабного російського вторгнення вагомою складовою двосторонніх економічних контактів був експорт Україною військової техніки та зброї до Китаю, який при цьому виступав найбільшим імпортером продукції вітчизняного військово-промислового комплексу. Тим не менш, в умовах повномасштабної війни вага військово-технічного співробітництва у відносинах Україна – КНР не тільки не зменшилася, але й надто зросла, перетворившись на важливий чинник перебігу війни із Кремлем. Відповідно мета даної статті полягає в аналізі зміни характеру та ролі ВТС між Україною та Китаєм, особливо в умовах повномасштабної російсько-української війни.

Методи. Було використано такі методи: аналітичний, історичний, статистичний, узагальнення, метод кейсів. У ході дослідження автор спирався на принцип об'єктивізму.

Результати. Дослідження демонструє виокремлення двох кардинально відмінних періодів у сфері ВТС між Україною та КНР: довоєнний та з моменту повномасштабного вторгнення. Після проголошення незалежності та до 2022 р. Україна виступала одним із джерел військової техніки та технологій, подекуди екстраординарних для Китаю у його прагненнях перетворитися на світову військову надпотугу. Для вітчизняного ВПК експорт продукції до КНР мав вагоме значення через відсутність значних внутрішніх замовлень, а Китай користувався цим через нагальну потребу альтернатив західним і російським поставкам зброї. Після повномасштабного російського вторгнення ситуація стала діаметрально протилежною: Україна почала активно закуповувати китайські дрони та комплектуючі до них. Водночас ще більш активним імпортером китайської продукції подвійного призначення стала Росія. На тлі систематичного моніторингу та превентивних погроз санкціями з боку країн Заходу КНР офіційно обмежила її експорт, однак фактично Кремль продовжує масштабно імпортувати все необхідне з Китаю, а Україна суттєво від цього постраждала. Такий підхід з боку КНР став одним із факторів того, що Україна почала програвати у так званій "війні дронів" із РФ.

Висновки. Китай отримав доступ до українських військових технологій у довоєнний період. Однак на тлі повномасштабної російсько-української війни Пекін вочевидь підтримує продукцією подвійного призначення подальше розгортання російського ВПК. Це призводить до постійного офіційного діалогу між Україною та КНР у негативному руслі.

Китай зацікавлений у затягуванні російсько-української війни з метою використання її як інструменту у своїх прагненнях встановити контроль над Тайванем. Значною загрозою для України буде гіпотетична ситуація прямих поставок зброї з Китаю до Росії. У будь-якому випадку існує нагальна потреба локалізації виробництва дронів та їх комплектуючих українським ВПК.

Ключові слова: військово-технічне співробітництво, торгівля зброєю, продукція подвійного призначення, відносини Україна – Китай, китайсько-російські відносини, повномасштабна російсько-українська війна, "проросійський нейтралітет" Китаю.

Автор заявляє про відсутність конфлікту інтересів. Спонсори не брали участі в розробленні дослідження; у зборі, аналізі чи інтерпретації даних; у написанні рукопису; в рішенні про публікацію результатів.

The author declares no conflicts of interest. The funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; in the decision to publish the results.