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ON SOME DIFFERENCES IN POTESTARISM AND TOTALITARISM IN THEORY AND SOCIO-POLITICAL PRACTICES

The aim of the article is a theoretical description of some of the distinguishing characteristics of totalitarian and potestary regimes. The construction of a descriptive characteristic of the differences between potestarism and totalitarianism implies, first of all, an understanding of the differences in their ethnopolitical strategies. Under the conditions of a potestary state, the strategy of conquest is used with the creeping ethnic assimilation of the titular ethnos by ethnic minorities. Such a strategy reflects the ideas of pre-modern culture, in which ethnic (and, moreover, national) differences are not articulated, since the conquering ethnic group turns into the ruling class and either does not have the opportunity to declare its ethnic identity, or is interested in its conscious concealment.

Both the first and the second correspond to central cultural corruption, the manifestations of which are interethnic tensions in the absence, on the part of cultural and political elites, of understanding its causes. Potestary states reveal their exoculturality and exopolitarity, which is associated with the import of cultural and political elites, hidden internal (cultural and political) colonization, cultural imperialism of some societies in relation to others, and, as a result, with the loss of the vector of progress.

In relation to society, potestary states apply a theatrical (performative) model of governance: they are not interested in the social situation in a set of any empirical features, but in artifacts constructed by the authorities themselves. These artifacts are created as a result of the destruction of social capital, a complete loss of trust, an increase in the toxicity of social relations and an increase in the external reference of cultural elites, a concomitant manifestation of a vertical cultural split in society.

Key words: potestarism, totalitarianism, fascism, communism, exoculturalism, endoculturalism, exopolitarianism, endopolitanism, ethnacratic nationalism, nationalist nationalism.

Problem formulation, purpose of the article and presentation of the main provisions. Modern scientific and, especially, journalistic discourse is full of various parallels and analogies. The huge flow of various materials that appeared after February 24, 2022 contains a steady line on the re-actualization of the problems of totalitarianism in its various macro-regional and state versions. In this aspect, the conceptual confusion that representatives of the scientific world, following propaganda clichés, bring to the semantic field of understanding the totalitarian regime, referring to it, in particular, the political regime of Russia, cannot but cause confusion.

In history textbooks, the terminological stamp-stereotype "rashism" is already fixed, which should cause stable associations between the type of state power and ideology existing in the Russian Federation and fascism, which, in turn, implies the work of ideological connotations in the mass consciousness and the formation of an appropriate emotional and evaluative attitudes around the world to this phenomenon.

In connection with the above circumstances, the question arises of the semantic correctness of the indicated parallels, suggesting the identification of fascism and Putinism as essentially heterogeneous regimes that have not only a different value-ideological superstructure, but also different politogenesis, different patterns of relations with society, different social bases and technologies. . The indicated differences imply a revision or construction of a new conceptual model of totalitarianism as a type of political regime that is opposite to potestarism.

It is worth noting that "lumping together" communist and fascist regimes as allegedly belonging to the totalitarian type seems not only conceptually incorrect, but also ideologically flawed due to insufficient understanding of the differences in the construction of their axiosphere, social base and politogenesis. Not only that: such biased confusion is the product of an insufficient understanding of the differences within fascism itself as a product of industrial (capitalist) civilization in its complete contrast to communism as potestarism, a product of pre-industrial society.

Researchers in the field of philosophy of law (G. Kelsen and K. Schmitt) partially devote their works to potestarism among researchers in publications [5; 18], partly - political anthropology. At the same time, G. Kelsen and K. Schmitt, analyzing potestarism, mean the transition from the legal state of the state to the so-called potestar state, when the very existence of the state is threatened and this state, to put it mildly, is not up to the law, not to the procedures , not up to legality, etc. .

However, such an assessment seems to be very reasonable but not complete, since it does not fix the difference between potestarism and totalitarianism. Totalitarian states can also function in an ordinary (normal, not emergency) state, since totalitarianism can carry not only a pathopolitical, but also quite normal semantic load.

An Africanist of Marxist orientation L. Kubbel paid considerable attention to potestarism in his works, linking this phenomenon, first of all, with primitive societies. According to Marxist theory, politics exists only in a class society and is a derivative of class relations and differentiation of macro-group characteristics.

The Marxist understanding of potestarism presupposes its pre-political and non-class (non-class, non-caste) interpretation, since for Marxists relations in primitive society cannot contain a political component, which implies the use of a completely different thesaurus. Just such a construct was proposed by L. Kubbel in the 70s of the XX century. to define relations in primitive society as potestary (from Latin potestas - power). L.E. Kubbel suggested calling political anthropology "potestarno-political ethnography", writing a paper on this topic [2-3].

The theories of totalitarianism were influenced by the general atmosphere of the Cold War, in which the focus of research was shifted from the polar opposition of fascist and communist states to the general moments of their politogenesis, due to which some confusion of classifications was formed in science in terms of referring to one type (generic concept) fascist and communist states as supposedly "totalitarian".

Drawing parallels between communist potestarism and the Asian type of state at that time was not in the trend

of comparative political science, and therefore the potestar state of the feudal type with criminal-kleptocratic quasi-elites, a genocidal-mechanistic attitude towards the population, representing okhlotic subgroups of ethnic minorities, demonstrating anomie of the highest level, internal corruption and economic inefficiency was identified with Nazi totalitarianism - a product of the industrial era, plebiscite democracy, organic solidarity with a racist-narcissistic attitude towards the population, representing the middle class of the titular ethnic group, overcoming systemic corruption from within and demonstrating the highest economic efficiency in the most inhumane forms.

A significant part of the ideas on the subject of totalitarianism is presented in the works of H. Arendt, P. Baldwin, A. Bauerkemper, P. Ignazzi, J. Pakulski, S. Payne, R. Robinson, S. Schoenfield [6-22]. The bibliography of totalitarianism has been appearing since the late 20s of the last century, when totalitarianism became the subject of attention from scientists of various directions, but, above all, from socio-political studies.

In the collection of articles edited by A. Fenner, E. D. Weitz "Fascism and Neo-Fascism", various authors demonstrate the relationship between the elite-club forms of neo-fascism and classical fascism, analyzing the anthropological, cultural-philosophical, socio-legal, ethno-mythological aspects of the ideology of fascism. Since neo-fascism is interpreted by the authors of the collection as a continuation of the practice and ideology of classical fascism, fascism itself as a phenomenon becomes a transhistorical and palingenetic construct, through the prism of which various transformational processes are considered [13]. The above assessment of fascism is also shared by the authors of the anthology "Fascism", published under the editorship of G. Griffin. In the collection, within the framework of one scientific project of various works in content, modern scientific approaches to understanding the phenomenon of fascism and neo-fascism are considered [14-15].

A. Bauerkemper in the monograph "Fascism in Europe 1918-1945." [8], which was devoted to the analysis of classical fascism, does not focus only on the ideology of fascism or on fascism as a political regime, since it is interested in the worldview and value-axiological dimensions of fascism as a phenomenon of the cultural life of different countries.

Modern studies of classical fascism also include the works of S. Breuer (key idea: nationalism is the fundamental cause of the emergence of fascism) [10]; V. Vipperman "European fascism in comparison" [24], in which fascism is considered both as a political regime and as a political movement that has a nationally specific form and ideological fluctuations; P. Ignazzi "Quiet counter-revolution", in which the author considers the development of fascism as a counter-revolutionary trend in relation to democracy, liberalism and the welfare state, that is, the idea that is a contraversion of democracy and the emergence of which is caused by growing dysfunctions and socio-economic and moral problems modern Western society; studies by P. Baldwin and J. Pakulsky, which are devoted to various aspects of the social interpretation of the problems of fascism and which consider not only interpretations of a theoretical nature (for example, the problem of adapting fascism to a particular national-ethnic system), but also the socio-stratification determinants of the emergence of fascist movements and the connection of these determinants with the ideology of fascist parties [7; sixteen; 20].

The purpose of the article is a theoretical description of some of the distinguishing characteristics of totalitarian and potestar regimes.

What differences appear in connection with the noted most significant? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to remember, first of all, that the processes of fascisization affected Europe and individual European states due to the incompleteness of the modernization processes, or rather, those versions of it that were "offered" by the liberal Anglo-Saxon world (Great Britain and the USA) Germany, Italy, Spain.

Therefore, fascism as an ideology was and remains anti-liberal and anti-socialist, but not anti-modernist and anti-enlightenment. Quite the opposite: all fascist regimes can be defined as totalitarian precisely because their cultural and value (ideological) superstructure suggests "hypermodernity" as an intensification of the fight against corruption and archaic remnants of feudal society[1], first of all, with the remnants of estates, on the other hand, with left-wing radical movements as anti-modernism aimed at building mechanistic (despotic) states with a potetocratic regime.

Totalitarianism as a type of political regime and social structure presupposes organic solidarity with the corresponding autopoeisis. The autopoietic nature of totalitarianism is obvious, since the elites of totalitarian states strive to bring all social institutions and groups of society not just to the same type (despotic) "equality before the law" and the state of imposition of the same type of systems of socio-normative regulation, but, first of all, to the recognition of the legitimacy of hierarchies that correspond to these systems of regulation. As will become clear later, all totalitarian regimes of the fascist type turned out to be endocultural and endopolitan, while communist and quasi-fascist (despotoid) regimes, which are more rationally classified as potestocratic, kleptocratic and criminocratic, showed pronounced exoculturality and exopolitarity.

The indicated features of potestocratic regimes not only made it difficult, but also made it impossible to build a society of organic solidarity through autopoeisis, since the imported cultural and political elites, which influenced the politogenesis of such societies, initiated the construction of (neo)feudal social structures with cultural anomie, mechanistic solidarity, class privileges, the privatized state and the technologies of criminal terror used by the elites in relation to the population.

The foregoing suggests the expediency in distinguishing between totalitarian and potestary regimes and the

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[1]German eugenics preceded the rise of Nazism, beginning shortly after German eugenicists debated the question of "racial hygiene" as applicable to one human race or to different races (it was about hierarchies of racial dignity). While the term "eugenics" is generally considered pejorative today as part of a doctrine often identified with National Socialism, many of its early proponents came from the political left. The Left, like many eugenicists, opposed such traditionally conservative institutions of society as the monarchy and aristocracy, on the grounds that they are genetically regressive, do not allow a correlation between political influence/power and biopotential. Many socialists believed that racial hygiene was concerned with theoretical and practical measures to improve a race or prevent its degeneration. Some socialists have argued that eugenics can be applied after class distinctions have been eliminated from society, when the social environment and the genetic causes of social ills can be separated. However, leftists eventually began to object to the growing racist sentiment among the people and its active practice in politics, medicine, and other fields [17, p.45].

introduction into the already known typology of political regimes (liberal, democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian) of the classification group of potestary regimes, which, in turn, include despotic, despotoid and communist regimes as their subtype (subgroup).

A) Exoculturality / endoculturality, exopolitarity / endopolitarity.

The essential distinguishing features of potestarism in comparison with totalitarianism are, firstly, the scenario of the cultural genesis and politogenesis of society, which involves dependence on imports of elite groups, both cultural and political. In potestary and despotic societies, cultural heterogeneity is derived from the inability of the society itself to support the internal process of cultural, and, as a result, political elitization.[2].

This inability has a number of negative consequences for society in the form of cultural and socio-structural effects. Negative cultural effects suggest central cultural corruption [23] and the external reference of cultural and political elites derived from it and, as a result, their estate, alienation in relation to society and pronounced extraterritoriality.

Speaking in simpler terms, in such a society, elite groups are under the external influence of other communities and reproduce sectarian consciousness and corporate xenophobia in relation to the autochthonous population, which at the level of everyday consciousness is expressed in a complex of arrogance / contempt / toxic hypercriticism in relation to the country. The exoculturality and exopolitarity of the elites creates not only the effects of alienation of the latter from society, but also the separation of the elites themselves from reality in the aspect of a critical and self-reflective attitude towards themselves, which triggers degradation processes within them, in the aspect of suppressing competition.

Fatal for both cultural genesis and politogenesis in this case is the version of a feudal-class society undergoing a devaluation of cultural capital in elite groups, which, due to such a devaluation, are chlotized and criminalized. A sufficient "value" for a society of cultural capital suggests that the social ties being built (social capital) are benign, since the construction of (good) quality social ties is impossible without cultural capital.

The fact that political elites have sufficient cultural capital presupposes the admission of competition with non-elite groups, since if political elites cannot withstand intellectual competition, then they cannot withstand economic and political competition, all the more.

In potestar (despotic or despotoid) societies, with a disturbed autopoeisis, political elites realize unfair competition in relation to cultural elites, since the latter cannot outgrow corporate consciousness, caste and class. The result of such unfair competition is a corrupt compromise: the institutional forms of domination of the political elites of post-starry societies are replaced by non-institutional (terrorist) ones, while any forms of real critical discourses of cultural elites turn into an imitation of discussions. This leads the political elites to the loss of the value of factual information about the society, and hence the progression of the most malignant forms of corruption.

The transformation of cultural capital into a simulacrum and its devaluation has a number of ominous consequences for society. On the one hand, this consequence is elitocide in the field of science and the transformation of science itself into a tool for apologetics and the construction of an inverted reality. At the same time, political elites create a request for cultural elites to incorporate propaganda into socio-humanitarian knowledge, which entails the distortion of social factuality and the replacement of social reality with political performances.

In the natural sciences and in relation to specialists in the natural sciences and technical profile, a strategy of domestication is used, turning them into servants of the special services through bribery through the distribution of positions, privileged remuneration system, the introduction of incompetent administration of scientific communities, which leads to their moral decay. In extreme cases (as in the Stalinist USSR and in North Korea), potestary regimes use for this purpose the technologies of penitentiary slavery, the creation of a kind of prison ghetto for scientists, where the intelligentsia is subjected to comprehensive deprivation, used for the sake of training obedience and a malignant metamorphosis of the intellectual class with research and critical functions. to the disciplinary (disciplinary service) authorities.

B) The need for an empirical versus performative understanding of sociality.

Totalitarian regimes have a need to control social reality, and therefore they use a variety of tools to "probe" it, ranging from super-complex social monitoring mechanisms to primitive surveillance and denunciation. However, the difference between control under totalitarianism and control under potestarism lies in its purpose. Totalitarian control assumes the function of feedback between various institutions, groups and individuals and performs an indicative function.

Control is exercised to maintain social homeostasis and eliminate factors that violate social balance, and for the necessary autopoeisis, which is reproduced only under conditions of cultural and social consensus. The elites of totalitarian regimes are therefore interested in knowing and understanding what is really happening in society, which requires both realistic insight and insight, as well as sensitivity.

Potestary regimes have no need to control social reality in the sense that control is an indicative function of maintaining feedback. Of course, there can be no talk of any "feedback" in the aggregate and mechanistically constructed sociality of potestarism, since potestary regimes, due to their exoculturality and exopolitarity, are not concerned with regulation, which reflects certain needs of the population.

The purpose of control for potestary regimes is its performative function: the government sees in society only what it wants to see, but not what society (more precisely, aggregate sociality) actually represents. Therefore, the

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[2]Potestarian societies are forced to resort to importing cultural and political elites. This import can occur both in two spheres, and in one of them; however, these processes are most often complementary. So, Russia, starting from the 17th century, turned into a kind of import territory for feudal elites, who were imported either through the conclusion of marriage unions, or through numerous migration and "political tourism", which ended with the French, Germans, Danes getting sinecures in the feudal state. There was an external Frenchization of cultural elites and Germanization of political ones, which created the basis for intercultural splits of various elite groups, in particular, gave rise to a stable conflict between the authorities and the intelligentsia. In Chile, after the end of the Second World War, the regime of A. Pinochet resorted to the import of Nazi military and securitary elites, which contributed to external modernization, but had little effect on the potestar essence of the regime.

authorities are little interested in the empirical dimension of sociality, comprehensively planting performativity and theatrocracy. The effect of performativity and theatrocracy is obvious, and it is connected with the government's request for deceit and distorted social reactions to its decisions and initiatives.

The above is projected primarily on the features of the public discourse of the authorities, their political and administrative elites, which is expressed in the use of silence / ignoring technologies or "shift texts" containing hints and / or meanings that require understanding "from the opposite". So, if the potestary government informs the population that it is not going to raise taxes or is not going to carry out additional mobilization in the conditions of war, then this means, exactly the opposite, that taxes will be increased and additional mobilization carried out.

The corporate consciousness of cultural elites and its dissemination in society entails the devaluation of factuality in everyday relations of people, which are acquiring more and more pronounced features of performativity. Such performativity, combined with complexes of pride / contempt / disgust / fear of the elites, combined with intimidation, harassment, and a pronounced distrust of ordinary citizens towards each other, also devalues social capital.

The metamorphosis of ties of trust into ties of domination, use, and manipulation, which is daily performed in potestary societies, is the reverse side of the rejection of factuality, and therefore the denial of honesty, which is the basis of any culture and the capitalization of benign social ties.

Cultural and sociopathic regeneration of social ties is accompanied by the emergence of toxic emotions and toxic emotionality in social communications, which in the political aspect corresponds to the spread of mobbing, ostracism, denunciation, extra-procedural forms of repression against dissidents.

It is worth noting that a number of fascist (according to formal characteristics) regimes, in particular, the Croatian fascists (Ustashe) and the Romanian Iron Guard, are, by virtue of the above, not totalitarian, but potestar (despotoid). Both the Codrianists in Romania and the Ustaše in Croatia were products of external influence, both cultural and political, and were imported elites who showed all signs of sectarianism and caste towards Romanian and Croatian society.

The exoculturality and exopolitarity of the group is accompanied by despotism as a reaction to the incompatibility of the values of this group with the values of the autochthonous population and the impossibility of reaching a consensus with this population regarding values, and hence social order and power. Despotism motivates mechanistic and terrorist action and induces such groups to act in force regimes that clearly do not correspond to the rhythms of the social time of this or that society.[3]. The aforementioned testifies in favor of the fact that despotic societies are losing their totalitarianism, which means that the groups of people described above are losing signs of fascist, that is, totalitarian. This means that they can and should be classified as potestar groups, and their ideology should be defined not as totalitarianism/fascism, but as potestarism.

The external reference of the corresponding fascist groups in relation to the Mussolini regime in Italy suggested their inability to build a totalitarian society, which was expressed in the preservation of signs of extraterritoriality.

The Ustashe, in fact, the entire period of their preparation for the seizure of power, were in Italy in specially organized training camps. Having come to power (and in fact having moved from Rome to Zagreb) and being ordinary criminal elements, the Ustaše were concerned not with the development of culture, economy and the social sphere, but with issues of genocide and criminal pogroms, most of which were organized using a huge amount of senseless violence in relation to Serbs and Gypsies. However, the senseless violence of both the Ustashe and the Bolsheviks and within the framework of the political regimes they created is indicative for identifying these regimes as despotoid and potestary, but not as totalitarian.

The Codryanists created a "government within the government" with General Antonescu, which was actually supervised first from Italy, and later from Germany. Thus, both regimes can be considered initially mechanistic and despotic, violating the logic of autopoeisis, and therefore requiring extra-institutional (criminal) terror to maintain their dominance.

In Russia, the situation developed in a similar way, starting with exoculturalism and the formation of a stable trend of elite imports in the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire (Decembrists, populists, Slavophiles and Westerners, social democrats, and later Marxist-Leninists and Stalinists were an imported phenomenon and a product of external influence and social -political mimesis) and ending with "catching up modernization", the prerequisites for which were created by one continuous central (cultural) corruption, derived from the value-semantic incompatibility of cultural and political elites and the autochthonous population. And it is clear that the catching-up modernization was carried out mainly in a despotic and mechanistic manner, and therefore in a counter-totalitarian and anti-autopoetic way.

That is why in pre-revolutionary Russia a comprador bourgeoisie was formed, an externally referent social group, in whose culture concern for profit and the construction of shelters, philanthropy were bizarrely combined with corrupt practices in relation to wages, unconcern about dirt, rot and mustiness in the barracks of workers and financing from the comprador bourgeoisie the Bolshevik Party, in which the bourgeoisie itself saw no particular danger.

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[3]In a number of his publications, the author of this article explored such a variety of cultural pathology as distemporalization, heterarchization of values / distemporalization - the transformation of an institutional hierarchy) into a rank; the loss by social institutions of the function of reserving and distributing time and space in relation to various spiritual, material, social and other spheres of their regulation.

Two phenomena are implied here: fragmented use of time and meaningless time-wasting. It is worth noting that both the first and the second can be empirical indicators both at the level of social institutions and individual microgroups (individuals). Examples of time fragmentation can be impulsive planning used by officials (changing work schedules / plans from "day to day", "turbo mode" in making any strategic decisions by the leaders of social institutions, chronic haste in work, a combination of rush jobs and stagnation.

The fragmentation of time indicates the absence of a hierarchy of values, which means that the confusion of secondary goal-setting and the primary in relation to it value hierarchization. Individuals, groups, and social institutions that allow the fragmentation of time love to replace values with goals, as well as hierarchies of values with hierarchies of goals. Instead of hierarchies of goals (since goals cannot be hierarchized without the hierarchization of values), they get the traditional juxtaposition and chaos [4, c.37-51].

C) Institutional repression versus criminal terror.

Criminal terror as a technology of the power of potestary regimes involves not just the use of military formations and criminal technologies (murders, torture, pogroms, etc.), but the actual criminalization of the state, expressed both in the recruitment of criminal elements into political elites, and in their direct use in organizing military campaigns.

Fascist regimes, as totalitarian ones, resorted to the mobilization of criminal elements (some of the German Nazi assault squads, for example, were recruited from the criminal environment), but, on the other hand, aristocratic groups seem to be a more typical social basis for fascism. In Italy, these are the feudal-monarchist elites, in Spain - the military caste, in Portugal - representatives of the intellectual class, the university intelligentsia (which allowed some researchers and publicists to call the Salazar regime "professorocracy", which is only partly true).

Potestary and despotic regimes, which are steadily accompanied by the use of force technologies of social influence and control (and criminal-criminal ones, not least) are formed on the social foundation of ohlotic social groups. However, it is clear that the formation of such ochlotic groups is preceded by central (cultural) corruption, the core of which is a ban on cultural authenticity, the popularization of outwardly oriented hero worship, the philosophy of the supervalue of mimesis / mimicry of other communities and states, and hence the devaluation of internal cultural and social time and stimulating the import of cultural elites.

Already imported cultural elites become for the importing society a source of permanent exoculturality, which means cultural inferiority and devaluation of authentic cultural meanings. These processes affect the social order and politogenesis in the direction of the appearance of a shadow culture, shadow politics and shadow economy. The appearance of such a looking-glass makes the construction of a totalitarian society impossible, which is shown by the experience of Russia and the USSR, as well as Ustasha Croatia, Hodgist Albania and the militaristic quasi-fascist dictatorship of Ionescu in Romania, which was continued by the potestary despotoid Ceausescu regime.

D) External influence / self-relevance (hetero-reference / self-reference)[4].

In the context of cultural and political external influence, it is worth noting the peculiarities of cultural imperialism, as well as media and cultural trendsetting, and, first of all, the export of cultural elites under the conditions of potestary regimes by E. Gugnin. Totalitarian regimes, unlike potestary ones, in their cultural references correspond to the ideology of racism/ethnocentrism or civic nationalism.

The designated ideologies can acquire a more radical or latent expression and manifestation, which, however, does not prevent totalitarian regimes from "culling" elites of other cultures as carriers of unrest, or, speaking in the language of science, external references. That is why internal cultural colonization acquires political significance for

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[4]Its internal cultural colonization by other societies, gradual loss of subjectivity and transformation in relation to other societies into an object of external influence are signs of the post-war regime.

The Ukrainian sociologist E. Gugnin understands the technologies of external influence as algorithms for the implementation of strategies that allow achieving three groups of results (effects) of external influence: maintaining communications, maintaining exchange and/or different regimes of one-sided (unprofitable, non-constructive) use of resources and dependence/destruction of certain societies by others In accordance with the proposed structure of levels and types of external influence within the framework of the implementation of the task, E. Gugnin built a typology of technologies of external influence, which includes technologies of external influence at the levels of culture/communications, population, economy and politics. In each group of technologies, subgroups of technologies of communication/partnership, exchange/dependence and exploitation/destruction are highlighted. In particular, we are talking about technologies of external influence at the cultural level: a) communication/partnership technologies, in particular: intercultural communications and productive internalization of the cultural experience of other societies (scientific, technical, educational exchange). b) technologies of non-equivalent (non-constructive) exchange and exploitation, in particular: cultural imperialisms (scientific, media, educational, artistic, etc.), export of cultural elites, cultural and media trendsetters; c) technologies of domination/subjugation (exploitation/violence, destruction), in particular: cultural (in modern conditions - informational, media, artistic) wars.

The author refers to the technologies of external influence at the level of the economy: a) communication/partnership technologies, in particular: trade, organization of enterprises, banking and financial institutions, etc. components of the economic system within the framework of economic cooperation systems; b) technologies of non-equivalent (non-constructive) exchange and exploitation, in particular: economically disadvantageous concessions, industrial espionage, non-equivalent trade, financial dependence (unprofitable lending, investment activities, etc.), economic expansions (capture of markets); c) technologies of domination/subjugation (exploitation/violence, destruction), in particular: economic sanctions, trade, financial and customs wars, artificial bankruptcy and sale of industrial, financial and land assets.

The author refers to technologies of external influence at the population level: a) communication/partnership technologies, in particular tourism and exchange programs, humanitarian aid, development of social infrastructure, migration and transition; b) technologies of non-equivalent (non-constructive) exchange and exploitation, in particular, export of human capital, stimulation of forced and illegal migration; c) technologies of domination/subjugation (exploitation/violence, destruction), in particular, the creation of deteriorated institutional conditions for the reproduction of the population by means of medical, educational, gender policy, biopolitics, ethnopolitics, etc., conventional and hybrid wars, colonization (colonialisms) and deportations (external and internal), genocides.

The author refers to technologies of external influence at the political level: a) technologies of communication/partnership, in particular: foreign political cooperation, formation of intergovernmental agreements, alliances and international organizations; b) technologies of non-equivalent (non-constructive) exchange and exploitation, in particular: export of political elites (political emissariat), implementation of restrictive political and legal standards. c) technologies of domination/subjugation (exploitation/violence, destruction), in particular: annexations, contributions, external governance (open or indirect protectorates), political lobbying, conventional and hybrid wars [1, c.579].

totalitarian regimes.

The Fascist regime of Mussolini and the National Socialist regime of Hitler demonstrate the political importance of cultural colonization in a common element of their programs - anti-Semitism. However, for National Socialism, the anti-Semitic trend of the program acquired the formulation of a radical solution to the Jewish question (the ideology of open racism/ethnocentrism).

For Italy and the Iberian fascist dictatorships (Franco's Falangists and Salazar's integralists), the formulation of the radical solution of the Jewish question was modified by the struggle against the left, i.e. cosmopolitans from ethnic minorities, which essentially meant the same thing - the exclusion of external influence through cultural imperialism (cultural colonization), the import of cultural elites and the acquisition of positions by the latter, suggesting cultural and media trendsetting.

Potestary regimes in radical ideologies prefer various versions of faceless chauvinism, "internationalism" and cosmopolitanism (in the extreme case, bashful ethnocentrism and ethnopolitics of double standards), which, however, do not correspond to their ethnopolitical practices.

Thus, in Russia, the ethnopolitics of double standards has acquired an extraordinary scope in the USSR and modern Russia. In the criminal legislation (both in the RSFSR and later in the Russian Federation), anti-Semitism was and remains a criminal offense for ordinary (non-status) citizens. This, however, did not at all prevent (and does not prevent) the prevalence of anti-Semitism in the cultural and political elites, which allow not only cultural colonization, but also forms of cultural imitation and replication of cultural products associated with it in various spheres.

On the other hand, the Stalinists and Putinists, as their inconsistent ideological followers, constantly exploit the propaganda discourses of "traditionalism", "conservatism", "traditional moral values", designed, for the most part, for the external target audience of some Western intellectuals. Among this part of Western intellectuals, the political elite of the Russian Federation seeks to form a respectable image of traditionalists and conservatives, which, however, does not correspond to reality.

Autopoieticity is the ability of a society to produce its own components from the totality. This means that society (if it is not just called such, but actually reproduces itself) is organically structured, it has irreplaceable and irreplaceable elements - culture, social institutions, social groups and individuals. Irreplaceability and irreplaceability does not mean the irreproducibility of such elements, but only temporary difficulties in their reproduction.

Other forms of sociality (in particular, social aggregates) do not represent a totality, and therefore cannot produce their own constituent parts from themselves. Social aggregates are mechanistically structured, and therefore they do not have irreplaceable and irreplaceable social elements - culture, social institutions, social groups and individuals.

Totalitarian states are autopoietic and self-referential because they are societies (social systems). Potestary states are mechanistic and heteroreferential because they are social aggregates. Social aggregation allows the authorities to deal with sociality based on "direct action", without requiring any additional legitimation for such direct action. In this aspect, sociality for the state is simply a building material, from which the authorities "sculpt" and form whatever they please.

Potestary regimes therefore replace legitimate procedures, rules with extraordinary bastard decisions. "Truth and truth" for potestarism consists exclusively in force, which is used, apart from any reasons, in eternal "emergency circumstances" and "force regimes". To get out of emergency situations and force modes, you need to have time. But potestary regimes do not have time in the sense in which its (time) presence presupposes the existence of a self-referential culture, and hence the necessary continuity. In the context of the foregoing, it is clear that exoculturality and exopolitarity correspond to spatial (and hence temporal) "holes", i.e. extra-spatiality and timelessness as synonyms of non-historicality.

E) Ethnacratic nationalism versus "nationalist nationalism".

The blocking of distinctive functions within the nation itself, its presentation as an imaginary territorial-political community results from the diffusion of the ethnic identity of the ethnic groups that make up this nation. Of these ethnic groups, in the conditions of potestary states, ethnic minorities stand out as leaders and showing the will to power, in contrast to the titular ethnic group, whose archetypal hypnosis motivates, speaking in unscientific language, to let everything take its course, and in a more scientific language, to allow any ethnocracy of ethnic minorities except ethnocracy of the titular ethnos.

The rejection of the titular ethnos from its own ethnocracy (which would logically lead to one or another version of nationalism, eventually outgrowing the doctrine of the nation, allowing ethnic pluralism within itself with a realistic distinction between the ethnic groups that make up the nation) in the conditions of a potestary state is accompanied by a false nationalism that hides the ethnocracy of ethnic minorities, posing as a nation-creative force. It becomes clear that such an ethnocracy is false and politically fraudulent, since it seeks to pass off the hidden interests of minorities as the interests of national integrity.

So "ethnacratic nationalism" in contrast to "nationalist nationalism" uses doctrinal rhetoric to achieve the banal goals of nihilistic parasitism and deconstruction. Here, in understanding, it is worth focusing on the differences between "nationalist nationalism" and "ethnacratic nationalism", since the former is represented in totalitarian states, and the latter in potestary ones.

"Nationalist nationalism" is derived from the rational-volitional desire for cultural homogenization (the process of achieving cultural and semantic consensus on cultural universals within society). This homogenization is preceded by an "inventory" of ethnic groups within the nation, with the provision of these ethnic groups with the cultural autonomy necessary to manifest their own cultural meanings. The manifestation of the meanings of the titular ethnos and ethnic minorities, in turn, is necessary to establish the similarities and differences between these meanings.

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Establishing similarities and differences in meanings makes it possible to determine the differences in the socio-constructive potentialities of each ethnic group / groups and the conclusion between this group / groups of a "social contract" (but not in the sense of J.-J. Rousseau) for the constitution on behalf of and with consent of other groups of a certain type of society with one or another socio-historical vector of movement and state sovereignty.

The very conclusion of this "social contract" (but not collusion or conspiracy) implies a) an open conflict within a multi-ethnic community in connection with the practices of ethnic exclusion, discrimination, apartheid, genocide, and so on. and/or b) the negotiation process of everyone with everyone (previously, allegedly impossible, due to the lack of appropriate information and communication technologies in modern societies, but quite possible in modern conditions of a post-information society).

Note that these processes often began in violent forms and implied a forceful solution to the issue of achieving cultural homogeneity. The forceful decision assumed certain projects of forced/non-violent assimilation, segregation or genocide, with the exclusion of the integration option.

The practices of monarchical or fascist regimes of one kind or another (Nazism, national clericalism, national integralism, monarchofascism, etc.) reflected the experience of failed integration of both titular ethnic groups and ethnic minorities within the framework of nation states, which led to those or other projects of fragmented or systemic genocide. Of the societies with designated ethnic cleansing regimes, Japan and Portugal were avoided. The first - due to ethnic homogeneity, achieved as early as the 16th century, the second - due to the acquisition of power by intellectualist meritocratic elites, whose rule is known as the "Salazar professorocracy".

"Ethnacratic nationalism" differs from "nationalist nationalism" in a number of ways. The first difference lies in the "mechanistic assembly" of the national whole from the forced-integrated ethnic groups, the cultural differences between which are ignored at the stage of gathering these ethnic groups into a territorial-political integrity.

The result of ignoring ethnic differences in such a gathering is the defectiveness of the indicated integrity due to the forced (and, moreover, latent) segregation and marginalization of some ethnic groups. Some of these ethnic groups are forced to resort to distorted ways of manifesting their own identity, including criminal behavior (sabotage, wrecking, terrorism, etc.) in order to get an opportunity to be heard.

But this opportunity to be heard is completely blocked by the titular superethnos, which, having gained power not as a result of an agreement (republican model), but as a result of collusion and conspiracy (oligarchic model), resorts to various information manipulations or open violence in order to prevent the will of other ethnic groups from being articulated. groups in the nation as a whole. National integrity turns out to be imaginary, fragmented and corrupted, which will be discussed later.

Ethnacratic nationalism covers nihilism as its real political ideology (as well as philosophy and religion) with pretentious simulation idealism, which reveals a complete inconsistency with the practices of materialistic parasitism and deconstruction.

Along with infection within themselves with malignant ethnocratic nationalism, ethnic minorities that reproduce this anti-ideology within the social space contribute to cultural, social and mental infection with the designated virus of deconstruction of the titular ethnos and other ethnic minorities. The general collective infection with the virus of deconstruction is recursed in the form of the spread of deconstructive simulation as cultural pathology and the transformation of society into a society of theater and games.

The second difference between "ethnacratic nationalism" and "nationalist nationalism" is the connection of the first with potestarism, and hence feudalism, and the second with the bourgeois-capitalist type of society (social system). Here it is worth delving into some propaedeutic platitudes that make it possible to differentiate potestarism / feudalism and capitalism (and totalitarianism derived from capitalist modernity) not just as socio-economic formations (in line with historical materialism), but as cultural structures.

Feudalism/potestarism represents a type of "chthonic" culture, since it corresponds to the dominance of chaotic sensibility over rationality, the personal over the impersonal, despotism over authoritarianism/voluntarism, the unconscious/id over consciousness/ego, privately fragmented opinion over total conceptual knowledge, egocentric matriotism over altruistic patriotism, conspiracy and conspiracy in politics over consensus and negotiations/electoral process, oligarchy over the republic, ethnic minorities over the ethnic majority, personal (client-patron) relations over institutional, private-personal "feeding-sinecures" over functional and socially useful positions, offshore (not only financial, but also spatial) over freak shows, linguistic games in mental activity over real intellectual productivity.

Derived from bourgeois modernity, totalitarianism represents a type of "Uranic" culture, since it corresponds to the dominance of rationality over sensuality, the impersonal over the personal and private, authoritarianism and voluntarism over despotism, ego-consciousness over the id-unconscious, total-conceptual over private-fragmented, patriotism over matriotism, open conflict, consensus and negotiations over concealed contradictions, latent war and collusion/conspiracy (oligarchy), ethnic majority over ethnic minorities, institutional-impersonal relations over irrational "privacy" (while legitimizing private property).

Conclusions. The construction of a descriptive characteristic of the differences between potestarism and totalitarianism implies, first of all, an understanding of the differences in their ethnopolitical strategies. Under the conditions of a potestary state, the strategy of conquest is used with the creeping ethnic assimilation of the titular ethnos by ethnic minorities. Such a strategy reflects the ideas of pre-modern culture, in which ethnic (and, moreover, national) differences are not articulated, since the conquering ethnic group turns into the ruling class and either does not have the opportunity to declare its ethnic identity, or is interested in its conscious concealment.

However, both the first and the second correspond to the central cultural corruption, the manifestations of which are inter-ethnic tension in the absence, on the part of the cultural and political elites, of understanding its causes. Potestary states reveal their exoculturality and exopolitarity, which is associated with the import of cultural and political elites, hidden internal (cultural and political) colonization, cultural imperialism of some societies in relation to others, and,

as a result, with the loss of the vector of progress.

In relation to society, potestary states apply a theatrical (performative) model of governance: they are not interested in the social situation in a set of any empirical features, but in artifacts constructed by the authorities themselves. These artifacts are created as a result of the destruction of social capital, a complete loss of trust, an increase in the toxicity of social relations and an increase in the external reference of cultural elites, a concomitant manifestation of a vertical cultural split in society.

Totalitarian states are a product of modern culture, and therefore their elites are pronouncedly ideocratic, oriented towards consistent racism/ethnocentrism/nationalism, which implies a conscious rejection of external (cultural and political) influence, any form of external reference, consistent exclusion of ethnic minorities for the benefit of the titular ethnic group or nation -hegemon, building a society through autopoiesis and on the basis of the so-called organic solidarity.

In the ethnopolitics of nationalism, ethnacratic nationalism corresponds to potestary states, and "nationalist nationalism" corresponds to totalitarian states. Ethnacratic nationalism corresponds to ignoring cultural differences between ethno-cultural communities in the phase of gathering these ethnic groups into a territorial-political integrity. "Nationalist nationalism" in achieving cultural homogeneity is preceded by an "inventory" of ethnic groups within the nation, which involves a) certain forms of ethnic discrimination / exclusion and / or b) granting these ethnic groups the cultural autonomy necessary to manifest their own cultural meanings.

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ПРО ДЕЯКІ ВІДМІННОСТІ МІЖ ПОТЕСТАРИЗМОМ ТА ТОТАЛІТАРИЗМОМ В ТЕОРІЇ ТА СОЦІАЛЬНО-ПОЛІТИЧНІЙ ПРАКТИЦІ

Метою статті є теоретичний опис деяких розрізняючих характеристик тоталітарних та потестарних режимів. Побудова описової характеристики різниці між потестаризмом і тоталитаризмом передбачає, насамперед, розуміння відмінностей їх етнополітичних стратегій. У разі потестарного держави використовується стратегія завоювання за повзучої етнічної асиміляції титульного етносу етнічними меншинами. Така стратегія відображає уявлення домодерної культури, в якій етнічні (і, тим більше, національні) відмінності на артикулюються, оскільки етнос-завойовник перетворюється на правлячий стан і або не має можливості декларувати свою етнічну ідентичність, або зацікавлений у її усвідомленому приховуванні.

Як перше, і друге відповідає центральної культурної корупції, проявами якої стає міжетнічна напруженість за відсутності, із боку культурних і політичних еліт, розуміння її причин. Потестарні держави виявляють свою екзокультуральність та екзополітарність, що пов'язано з імпортом культурних та політичних еліт, прихованої внутрішньою (культурною та політичною) колонізацією, культурним імперіалізмом одних суспільств по відношенню до інших, і, як наслідок – зі втратою вектора прогресу.

Стосовно суспільству потестарні держави застосовують театрократическую (перформативну) модель управління: їх цікавить не соціальна ситуація в наборі будь-яких емпіричних ознак, а сконструйовані самою владою артефакти. Ці артефакти створюються внаслідок руйнування соціального капіталу, повної втрати довіри, наростання токсичності соціальних відносин та посилення зовнішньої референтності культурних еліт, супутнього прояву у суспільстві вертикального культурного розколу.

Ключові слова: потестаризм, тоталітаризм, фашизм, комунізм, екзокультуральність, ендокультуральність, екзополітарність, ендополітарність, етнакратичний націоналізм, націоналістичний націоналізм.