THE SECURITY OF THE NORDIC STATES UNDER THE RUSSIAN HYBRID THREATS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17721/1728-2292.2025/2-61/139-143Keywords:
Nordic countries, Northern Europe, regional system of international relations, foreign policy strategy, regional security, hybrid warfare, state sovereignty.Abstract
Abstract
Introduction. The Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a critical turning point in the European security landscape, prompting Sweden and Finland to abandon their longstanding policies of neutrality in favor of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This strategic realignment has been accompanied by a notable intensification of Russian hybrid activity in Northern Europe. The resulting transformation of the regional security status quo presents NATO with novel challenges, underscoring the imperative for enhanced coordination mechanisms and deeper integration of the Nordic states into the Alliance’s strategic framework.
Methods. The study employs a functional analysis to assess the implications of Russian hybrid operations for the Northern European states, a comparative method to synthesize and contrast the existing scholarly interpretations, and an examination of open-source materials and statistical data to construct an empirical basis for evaluating the scope and impact of Russian hybrid influence in the region.
Results. The analysis delineates the evolving patterns and strategic objectives of Russian hybrid activities in Northern Europe following Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO accession. It further evaluates the Nordic states’ role in reinforcing the security architecture of NATO’s northeastern flank and identifies the key domains of vulnerability and potential countermeasures, with particular emphasis on the Baltic Sea region.
Conclusions. The escalation of Russian hybrid warfare in Northern Europe post-2022 is not merely a reactive measure to geopolitical shifts but constitutes a calculated element of a broader long-term strategy aimed at undermining the Euro-Atlantic unity and degrading the collective defense capacity of NATO. The study finds that Russian hybrid operations seek to erode the political and military readiness of Nordic states, foster gradual regional destabilization, and weaken the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance. Instruments employed in such strategy include the critical undersea infrastructure sabotage, electoral interference, migration crises orchestration, disinformation campaigns, and the GPS signals jamming.
References
Грідіна, І. М., & Булик, М. В. (2019). «Сіра зона» як інструмент гібридної війни Російської Федерації проти України. Challenges of Hybrid War: Information Dimension: International Scientific and Practical Conference, 10–15.
Кормич, Б. А. (2022). Концепція морської «сірої зони» та ситуація у Чорному та Азовському морях після незаконної анексії Криму. Європейський вибір України, розвиток науки та національна безпека в реаліях масштабної військової агресії та глобальних викликів ХХІ століття, 140–143.
Azad, T. M., Haider, M. W., & Sadiq, M. S. (2022). Understanding Gray Zone Warfare from Multiple Perspectives. World Affairs, 186, 81–104.
Bornio, J., & Szacawa, D. (2024). Finland’s response to the Russian Federation’s provocations regarding the change of maritime borders in the Baltic Sea. IEŚ Commentaries, 1135, 3.
Carment, D., & Belo, D. (2020). Gray-zone Conflict Management: Theory, Evidence, and Challenges. The Air Force Journal of European, Middle Eastern, & African Affairs, 2(2), 21–41.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2025, March 10). Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006 [Center for Strategic and International Studies]. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-02/250210_Cyber_Events.pdf?VersionId=mVS9NdLoTU7PuRE.O7eiNhj0INtYm8gQ.
Connable, B., Young, S., Pezard, S., Radin, A., Cohen, R. S., Migacheva, K., & Sladden, J. (2020). Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO in the Contact, Blunt, and Surge Layers of Competition. RAND Corporation, 92.
EBU Investigative Journalism Network. (2025, March 12). Playing With Fire: Are Russia’s hybrid attacks the new European war? Eurovision News. https://investigations.news-exchange.ebu.ch/playing-with-fire-are-russias-hybrid-attacks-the-new-european-war/#group-section-Mapping-Russian-Hybrid-Ops-V9BLhVEJFM.
Jordan, J. (2020). International Competition Below the Threshold of War: Toward a Theory of Gray Zone Conflict. Journal of Strategic Security, 14(1), 26.
Kaczmarek, K. (2024). Russia’s Weaponized Migration: Analysing its Impact on Finnish-Russian Border Security. Defence Science Review, 55–62.
Buchholz, K. (2025, February 6). Baltic Sea Cable Incidents Pile Up. Statista. https://www.statista.com/chart/33892/damage-to-underwater-cables-and-pipelines-in-the-baltic-sea/.
Paik, A., & Counter, J. (2024, January 25). International law doesn’t adequately protect undersea cables. That must change. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/hybrid-warfare-project/international-law-doesnt-adequately-protect-undersea-cables-that-must-change/.
Pirti, A., & Yucel, M. A. (2022). The impact of Russian on GPS signal jamming in the Scandinavian Region. Research Square. https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-1856904/v1/33937e66-ee32-4861-ad45-6f9718350c96.pdf?c=1659891566.
Estonia says Russia removed navigation buoys on border river (2024, May 23). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/estonia-says-russia-removed-navigation-buoys-border-river-2024-05-23/.
Rumer, E. (2019). The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23.
Waterman, S. (2024, July 10). Russian Jamming Is Wreaking Havoc on GPS in Eastern Europe. But Is It Hybrid Warfare? Air & Space Forces Magazine. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/russian-gps-jamming-nato-ukraine/.
